Customers and suppliers often make relationship specific investments whose value is undermined if the firm undertakes risky investments. Therefore risk taking incentives given to the CEO will be associated with lower relationship specific investment in the vertical channel. We find significant evidence that customer and supplier relationship specific investment declines with CEO risk taking incentives. Moreover, we find that customers of firms, where CEO risk taking incentives are more likely to increase volatility of cash flows, are more sensitive to these incentives. This evidence is robust to correction for endogeneity, inclusion of a wide array of controls and different proxies for relationship specific investments. By showing significant externalities of compensation, the results impart a different and important perspective to the debate on executive compensation.
The risk taking incentives given to the CEO have received significant attention lately. In particular, the negative effect of excessive risk taking by financial firms brought to light by the financial crisis has prompted the Securities and Exchange Commissioner, Mary Schapiro to consider requiring companies to disclose "how compensation impacts risk-taking" in its annual proxy statements.
2 Although, these incentives for risk taking can be valuable if they allow risk averse CEOs to undertake risky but positive NPV projects, they can be detrimental to other firms and entities that interact with the firm.
In this paper, we study the effect of managerial risk taking incentives on the vertical channel, i.e., customers and supplier firms. Customer and supplier firms often have to invest in relationship specific assets whose value is higher within the relationship. If the firm undertakes risky projects that increase the likelihood of financial distress it undermines the value of the relationship specific investment undertaken by their customers and suppliers. Consequently, customers and suppliers may respond to risk taking incentives given to the CEO by reducing their relationship specific investment.
For example consider, a customer firm like a soft drink bottling plant that incurs substantial relationship specific investments in their plants that are built to cater to the design and requirements of specific soft drink manufacturers. Or a supplier firm that incurs relationship specific investment when it chooses to locate its plant close to the firm. The value of these relationship specific assets depends on implicit contracts that bind the parties and lose value if the firm enters financial distress or liquidation. In some industries like the life sciences, firms are increasingly focused on core competencies while outsourcing important functions to third parties in the vertical channel. These interdependencies make customer and suppliers sensitive to firm's risk taking behavior. 3 Therefore, customer and supplier firms will be reluctant to invest in relationship specific assets if they perceive the firm as engaging in risk taking behavior. In this paper we hypothesize that customer and supplier firms observe CEO risk taking incentives and inferring increased volatility of cash flows are likely to respond by reducing their investments in relationship specific assets.
To examine this issue we construct two different datasets. First, we use the Compustat Segment data to put together a firm level dataset on the major customers of the firms, as firms are required to identify all major customers accounting for more than 10% of sales. Second, we use the Input-Output tables provided by the Bureau of Econmic Analysis to identify a firm's customer and supplier industries. This industry level dataset is not only larger but also mitigates some concerns of endogeneity that arise with the study of individual customer firms.
We use the research and development (R&D) intensity of customers and suppliers to proxy for the level of their relationship specific investments. This use of R&D intensity as a proxy for relationship specific investment is prevalent in the empirical literature on transactions cost economics; see Boerner and Macher (2001) for a recent review of this literature. The use of research intensity as a proxy for relationship specific assets is also supported by Levy (1985) who argues that research intensive industries have specialized inputs and require transaction specific investments by suppliers. Allen and Philips (2000) also argue that research intensive industries are more likely to create relationship specific assets. In addition, vertical chains that are R&D intensive are likely to have complex inter stage interdependencies (Armour and Teece, 1980) leading to high relationship specific investments.
For robustness we also study other proxies of relationship specific investments. Rauch (1999) shows that in differentiated good industries connections between buyers and sellers are made through a costly search process that gives rise to relationship specific assets. We examine capital expenditures in differentiated good industries to proxy for the extent of their relationship specific investment. Secondly, we use advertising intensity as a proxy for relationship specific investments. Titman and Wessels (1988) point out that advertising intensity proxies for product uniqueness and should be highly associated with relationship specific investment. Lastly, we use NBER data on patent citation to construct variables that capture the interdependencies between firms and their customers as a proxy for the existence of relationship specific assets. We get qualitatively similar results across all the proxies.
We find that relationship specific investments by customers at the firm level declines as managerial risk-taking incentives increase. This effect is robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of controls, inclusion of year and industry fixed effects. In other words, when CEO of firms are given greater incentives to take risks the investment made by customers in relationship specific assets declines. This effect is also economically significant. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in our measure of risk taking incentives decreases by 27% the relation specific investment by customers. We find similar results at the industry level: higher risk taking incentives in CEO compensation are associated with lower relationship specific investment by customer and supplier industries.
Further, we find that this negative relation between managerial risk taking and customer relationship specific investment varies by firm characteristics. CEO incentives for risk taking can have a large impact on the riskiness of investments and cash flows in firms undertaking large R&D investments, as well as, firms with large capital expenditures. We find that customers of such firms, with large R&D and capital expenditures, are more likely to reduce relationship specific investments in the presence of CEO incentives for risk taking. We also find that customers of manufacturing firms and those of focused firms, where relationship specific investments are more important, are more sensitive to managerial risk taking. In a similar spirit, we find that customers of firms operating in concentrated industries are likely to have less choice and are therefore less likely to reduce relationship specific investments in response to managerial risk-taking incentives.
One explanation for these results might be that unobserved firm characteristics associated with high managerial risk-taking incentives are also related to lower customer relationship specific investment. We control for this potential endogeneity by identifying two instruments for managerial risk taking and estimating a two stage least squares model. We find that the Hausman statistic is not significant suggesting a lack of significant endogeneity. The potential correction for endogeneity does not impact our results: we continue to find a significant negative relation between managerial risk taking and customer relationship specific investment.
If customers respond to managerial risk taking incentives by reducing their relationship specific investments the board should take this into account when deciding on the structure of CEO compensation. In other words, managerial risk taking incentives and customer relationship specific investments are likely to be jointly determined. We find significant evidence in support of this, i.e., managerial risk taking incentives and customer relationship specific investments are jointly determined and negatively related to each other.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. To begin with, we make a methodological contribution by using a new measure to capture the CEO incentives for risk taking. The extant literature uses option vega to capture risk shifting incentives and includes option delta to control for pay for performance incentives. We find that the correlation between vega and delta incentives of a firm is very large, to the tune of 0.94 and highly significant.
Therefore, we develop a new measure, referred to as managerial risk-taking incentive or MRI, which is the ratio of vega to delta incentives. This variable has an intuitive interpretation, i.e., it captures the vega incentives per unit of delta incentives or the relative strength of the risk taking
incentive. This measure of managerial risk taking has also been recommended by Dittman and Yu (2008) . Though results in the paper use MRI as the measure of risk taking incentives, all our results hold if we use vega as our measure of risk taking.
Secondly, the paper is among few to show that the impact of a firm's compensation policy has important implications for entities outside the firm. An exception is Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) that examine the role of CEO delta incentives in mitigating competition in the firm's industry. We complement their study by documenting that compensation policy of a firm influences the investment decisions of customer and supplier firms. By showing significant externalities of compensation, the results impart a different and important perspective to the debate on executive compensation. As the investments made by customers and suppliers are integral to the long term growth of the firm, this paper underscores the importance of understanding all channels by which stock options may impact the value of the firm. It also highlights that compensation policy can have important externalities as it affects investment decisions down the vertical channel. This is not only important for firms, their customers and suppliers but also regulators as they deliberate on how to regulate compensation and its disclosure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 lays out the basic analysis, and Section 5 examines cross sectional differences in the impact of MRI. Section 6 examines alternate proxies for relationship specific investment, Section 7 controls for endogeneity, Section 8 discusses if managerial risk taking and customer relationship specific investment are jointly determined, Section 9 discusses industry level analysis and finally Section 10 concludes.
Literature Review
Our paper is related to two different strands of the literature. Firstly, it is related to the body of work that studies relationship specific investment. Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) show that when customers make relationship specific investment that loose value in liquidation, a firm may choose to lower its leverage to account for the effect of financial distress on customers. 4 Kale and Sharur (2007) test this empirically and document a negative association between relationship specific investments of customer and suppliers and firm leverage. Aside from capital structure, presence of relationship specific investments has also been shown to impact earnings management. Raman and Shahrur (2008) document that firms manage earnings opportunistically to manage the perceptions of suppliers and customers to ensure their relationship specific investments. We contribute to this literature by documenting that customers and suppliers observe CEO compensation and respond to the risk taking incentives implied in this compensation policy.
The paper is also related to the literature that identifies and studies issues other than the relationship specific investment in the vertical channel. Fee and Thomas (2004) study whether acquisitions increase upstream and downstream market power. Allen and Philips (2000) and 4 Expected value of relationship specific investments made by customer and supplier firms are likely to loose value as the likelihood of financial distress increases and well before firm liquidation (See Senbet (1978, 1988) .
Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) study the relationship between equity ownership and product market relations in the vertical channel.
Finally, the paper is related to the large and vast literature that examines executive compensation. Consistent with the literature that has documented significant effect of pay for performance incentives on firm decisions we estimate and control for these "delta" incentives.
In particular, we use the methodology for estimating delta incentives developed in Yermack (1995) , Core and Guay (1999) , and Mehran (1995) Though it is clear from existing literature that CEO compensation has a significant effect on a host of firm decisions, it is less clear if it has any effect at all outside the firm. Agarwal and Samwick (1999) are among the first to examine potential externalities from CEO competition when they study its role in softening product market competition among rivals in competitive industries. We contribute to this literature by showing that CEO compensation significantly impacts the behavior of customers and suppliers. Moreover, as this effect takes the form of reduced investment in the vertical channel it impacts firm value over the long term.
Data and Sample Description
We begin by identifying all firms covered in Execucomp over the 1994 to 2007 period.
We exclude utilities and financial firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999, and 6000 and 6999, respectively) giving us a sample of 17,661 firm-years. We then identify key customers for this sample using the Compustat industry segment files. The Compustat industry segment data consists of key customer names for public companies as public firms are required by SFAS 14
and SFAS 131 to report customers which account for at least 10% of their annual sales. As the industry segment files identify customers by names, we match these names to GVKEY and other identifiers. 5 We are able to find a customer firm for only 4224 firm years in our Execucomp sample. Though this is a sharp drop, it is comparable to the 9,452 firm-years with identifiable customer firms in all of Compustat over a 20-year period reported in Kale and Shahrur (2007) .
Further, as we need compensation data for each customer firm we have to drop observations where the customer firm is not covered under Execucomp. This leads to a sample of 3565 firm years.
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For firms with multiple customers, we use the percentage of the firm's sales to these customers as weights to construct customer level variables. Note that because firms generally do not report all customers, the weights are not required to sum to one for each firm-year. 7 We then construct the weighted average R&D of all customer firms where the weight is customer share in firm sales as defined above. This construction is similar to Kale and Shahrur (2007) and uses the ratio of R&D to total assets to capture customer R&D intensity. We also construct similar weighted average values of Customer Leverage, Customer Vega, and Customer Sales Growth for each firm-year.
Measures of CEO Incentives
Consistent with most of the existing literature, we calculate the option delta to capture pay for performance or effort incentives given to CEO and use option vega to capture the incentives for increased risk taking by the CEO.
The option delta (per option) is the partial derivative of the option value with respect to stock price. We use the Black-Scholes model adjusted for dividend payouts (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) to value the options. 8 We obtain the "moneyness" of previously granted options by finding the realizable value of previously granted options (the difference between the 6 Firms do not directly report names of suppliers. Some suppliers can be inferred by inverting the dataset. However, since firms report only major customers we are able to identify only small suppliers of large firms through this inversion. Therefore we do not study suppliers at the firm level. We construct an industry level dataset, discussed later in the paper, to examine the effect on supplier R-S investment. 7 The results do not change if we change these data criteria. For e.g., not imposing the restriction that customers are covered in Execucomp or forcing the customer weights to sum to one does not change our results. 8 As ExecuComp does not offer details on previously granted options, we make assumptions about T, the time to maturity, and X, the exercise price. If there are no option grants in the current year, we set T equal to nine years for unvested previously granted options and six years for previously vested options. If there are current option grants with T less than three years, we set the T for all previously vested options equal to the T for current options. For current option grants with T greater than or equal to three years, we set unvested previously granted options to T -1, and vested previously granted options to T -2.
realizable value of all options less the realizable value of current options), and then divide it by the number of previously granted options. We estimate the exercise prices of previously granted options by subtracting this calculated moneyness from the current stock price. We compute the delta and the corresponding option sensitivity separately for newly granted options, vested options, and unvested options and a weighted average of these is the total option sensitivity.
Our main measure for the pay for performance incentives of CEO's option, referred to as Delta, is the product of the above estimated per option delta with the number of options owned by the CEO. This measure, used by Core and Guay (2002) , captures the change in the value of the options held by the CEO for a 1% change in stock price. We repeat our analysis with an alternate measure, which is the product of the per option delta with the ratio of the number of options owned by the CEO to the number of shares outstanding in the firm. This alternate measure was used by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Yermack (1995) and captures the change in the value of options held by the CEO for a dollar change in firm value. All our results are robust to using this alternate measure of delta incentives. As in Daniel, Coles and Naveen (2007) and Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2008), we calculate vega to capture the sensitivity of the CEO's option compensation to volatility. This is the product of the per option vega and the number of options held by the CEO. Our results are robust to the alternate measure of risk taking incentives, which is the product of the per option vega and the ratio of the number of options held by the CEO to shares outstanding.
As seen in Table 1 , the average Delta is $201,540 i.e., value of CEO options changes by $201,540 for every 1% change in stock price. 9 The mean value of Vega is $171,469. Table 2 presents correlations between selected compensation variables. We note that the correlation between Delta and Vega is 0.94 and highly significant. In view of this high correlation, we define another variable to capture risk taking incentives. This new measure is the ratio of vega to delta and is denoted by managerial risk-taking incentives or MRI.
This measure of risk taking has also been explored recently by Dittman and Yu (2008), who model the endogeneity between risk and effort incentives and emphasize that volatility has both a direct and an indirect effect on manager's wealth. The direct effect is captured by vega,
i.e., the effect of volatility on the value of the stock options. However, volatility also has an indirect effect: an increase in volatility increases firm value as more valuable risky projects are adopted. This increase in stock price then feeds through to managerial wealth via the manager's incentive pay, i.e., delta. Dittman and Yu (2008) argue that whereas vega just captures the direct effect of volatility, MRI captures both the direct and the indirect effects. In line with Dittman and Yu (2008) we use MRI as our measure to capture the risk taking incentives provided to the CEO. The higher is the value of MRI the greater are the incentives provided for risk taking.
The mean value of MRI is 0.844 and its correlation with delta and vega is low (See Table 2 ). 
Customer R-S Investment and other characteristics
As discussed above, we use customer and supplier R&D intensity, proxied by the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets, to capture their relationship specific (R-S) investments. Later in the paper, we will present results with alternate measures of relationship specific investments.
While our main variable of interest in explaining customer R-S investments is the CEO risk taking incentives, we control for a number of other factors that are likely to impact customer R-S investments. These factors belong to three major groups: 1) compensation policy and CEO 10 We estimate our base results with two other measures of managerial risk taking. The first is the product of MRI and the total number of options held by the CEO. The second is the ratio of vega to delta but using both stock and option vega and delta. This captures the risk taking incentives from total compensation as opposed to those from options. The results with these different measures of risk taking are similar and have not been reported for brevity.
characteristics, 2) firm characteristics and 3) customer characteristics. We control for CEO compensation effects by including the delta incentives, cash compensation and the CEO's equity ownership level. We also control for CEO tenure and create a dummy that captures years of CEO turnover as these years may be associated with a shift in compensation structure. A detailed description of the variables is provided in Appendix A.
We control for several firm characteristics, namely firm size (proxied by log of total assets), Tobin's Q, market leverage, and firm profitability as proxied by return on assets. We also control for the firm's research intensity by the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets to control for high research intensity of the vertical channel. The higher is the investment in research by the firm, the more likely are customers to increase relationship specific investment.
We also include sales volatility, as this might be associated with greater distress and therefore lower R-S investment.
Lastly, we control for characteristics of the customer that might impact its research intensity. Customer research intensity will be affected by the incentives given to its own CEO.
In particular, if customer CEO held options with high vega they are likely to have an incentive to increase the riskiness of their firm's cash flows that are likely to be captured in their research intensities. We also control for customer leverage and customer sales growth. We calculate the customer Herfindahl index of sales to capture the degree of competition in the customer industry.
If the Herfindahl index is high, or the customer industry is very concentrated, we expect lower investment in research.
Customer R-S Investments
In this section, we first discuss results from an OLS estimation to explain customer R-S investments. We begin by examining the relationship between customers R-S investment and the CEO's delta incentives. As higher delta incentives align CEO incentives with those of shareholders, they are likely to be associated with value enhancing firm decisions. Consequently, they should be associated with greater R-S investment from customers. In contrast to this expected positive relationship, we find that the coefficient of Delta is negative though not significant (see Model 1 in Table 3 ). In Model 2, we examine the relationship between risk taking incentives as captured by vega and customer R-S investment. As expected the coefficient is negative and significant. In Model 3, we include both delta and vega incentives, as has been done by the extant literature, and find that both coefficients are of opposite signs and highly significant. This result is consistent with the finding of the prior literature and arises due to the high correlation, of almost 0.94, between the delta and vega incentives.
To take care of this high correlation, we construct the ratio of vega to delta which we refer to as managerial risk-taking incentives or MRI. High values of MRI imply high vega incentives relative to delta incentives and should be associated with lower customer R-S investment. As expected, the coefficient of MRI is negative and highly significant (See Model 4, Table 3 ). 11 The larger are the managerial risk taking incentives the smaller is the customer R-S investment. Though MRI captures the strength of the vega incentives to delta incentives, it fails to capture the level of overall incentives. Therefore, we also include the number of options held by the CEO to capture the level of overall incentives from options which is not significant.
This significant negative effect of MRI is robust to including industry effects (model 5).
12 This effect of MRI on customer relationship specific investment is not only statistically significant, it 11 As can be seen in Table 3 , the number of observations drop when we introduce MRI in our estimation. This is because MRI is the ratio of Vega/Delta and is therefore undefined when delta is zero. 12 All our results are qualitatively similar with the inclusion of industry fixed effects. As discussed later, one of our instruments is based on industry and cannot be used with industry fixed effects. Consequently, we have chosen to report all results without industry fixed effects so results are comparable across the paper.
is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in MRI leads to a 27% decrease in customer R&D intensity from it unconditional average.
Overall, the results for the control variables are as expected. Customer relationship specific investment is higher for small firms, and firms with higher R&D investment. We also find that customer characteristics, especially customer vega has a significant positive effect on their research intensities.
We have identified the major customers of firms and find that on average they respond to increased risk taking incentives by reducing their R&D intensities or relationship specific investment. However, some of these customers may be large for e.g. when Walmart is one of the major customers. With these large customers, only a small fraction of their total R&D expenses may be directed towards relationship specific investment with any particular supplier and therefore their overall R&D intensity may not change much in response to increased risk taking by an individual supplier. To examine whether the effect of risk taking incentives is stronger for the smaller customers, we calculate the relative size of all customers defined as the ratio of the customer assets to firm assets. All customers with relative size greater than the median are classified as large customers with the remaining classified as small customers. We then estimate the weighted R&D intensity separately for these large and small customers. As seen in Table 3 continued, the significant effect of MRI on relationship specific investment is seen only for small customers (Model 6) and is not significant for large customers (Model 7). This is as expected and is reassuring as it suggests that the effect of MRI is not due to omitted firm level characteristics which would impact both small and large customers in a similar way.
For any given firm, compensation contracts are likely to show substantial changes when a new CEO is hired and/ or there are significant changes in the operating and governance environment of the firm. However, as these events are rare we expect that a substantial variation in the MRI arises due to differences between firms rather than differences over time for a given firm. To shed light on this we estimate a between effects estimator as well as a within effects estimator. As expected, we find that most of the effect of risk incentives on customer relationship specific assets is seen in the cross section rather than in the time series (See Table 3 continued, Model 8 and 9).
Lastly, as our dependent variable is the weighted average R&D intensity for all customers it takes the value of zero if none of the customer firms report R&D expenses. To take care of the potential issues arising with this truncation, we also estimate a Tobit Model and as seen in
Model 10 of Table 3 continued. This has no material impact on our results.
MRI and Customer R-S Investment: Cross Sectional Differences
Results in the prior section suggest that when the managerial risk taking incentives are large, customers reduce R-S investments. However, high MRI is likely to have different impact on the riskiness of cash flows for different firms. For example, when firms have no investment or capital expenditures CEO's have less latitude in changing the risk of firm cash flows even though they may have high risk taking incentives. In contrast, CEO in firms with high investment or capital expenditures can have a significant impact on the riskiness of the cash flows through their investment decisions. Therefore, the customers of these firms are likely to be more sensitive to risk taking incentives. We examine if customers of firms with large investments reduce their R-S investments more in the presence of risk taking incentives. We use the R&D intensity of firms, as well as the capital expenditures to proxy for the investment intensity of firms.
To capture high capital expenditure by firms we create a dummy variable, referred to as High-CAPEX that equals one if the firm is in the top tercile of the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. We also construct a low-CAPEX dummy that takes the value one for the remaining firms. To throw light on the differential impact of MRI on customer R-S investment for these two groups we implement the following procedure: each independent variable is interacted with the High-CAPEX dummy and included, along with the independent variables, in the regression of customer R-S investment. The coefficients for the non-interacted independent variables capture the impact for the low CAPEX group (the dummy is zero and, therefore, so are the interaction terms). Then we repeat the above estimation procedure but this time by interacting the low-capex dummy with the independent variables. The non interacted independent variables now capture the impact for the high CAPEX group. The coefficients on the interactions term capture the difference between the low and high capex groups. 13 We do a similar estimation of differences between firms with non-zero R&D and those without.
As seen in panel A of Table 4 , MRI has a greater impact on customer R-S investment for firms with positive R&D. The negative effect of MRI on customer relationship specific investment is significantly higher for firms with R&D relative to those with no R&D. A very similar pattern is seen in panel B when we examine high and low CAPEX firms. For firms with high capital expenditures, customers reduce their R-S investments to a significantly larger degree than for firms with lower capital expenditures.
In a similar spirit, firms in manufacturing industries need to undertake more R-S investment. As customer R-S investment is more important in manufacturing industries we expect a higher impact of MRI on customer R&D in manufacturing industries. We classify all firms where the main industry is in the two digit SIC 20 to 39 as manufacturing firms. The results, displayed in Panel C of table 4 show that the impact of MRI on customer R-S investment is significantly more negative for manufacturing firms relative to non manufacturing firms.
In panel D, we examine the impact of risk taking incentives in concentrated industries.
When firms operate in concentrated industries customers may have few choices. In contrast, in competitive industries customers may have more choice and consequently react strongly to the presence of risk taking incentives by reducing their R-S investments. We classify industries as concentrated if their sales herfindahl index is in the top tercile of all firms in the sample. We find significant evidence that in competitive industries, risk taking incentives have a significantly more negative effect on customer R-S investment.
Next we examine the impact of MRI in focused vs. diversified firms. As diversified firms operate in multiple industries, increased risk taking activities in any industry is likely to lead to lower overall increase in firm level volatility and therefore likely to lead to a smaller response by customer firms. Consistent with this we find that there is a significantly higher impact of MRI on customer RSI in focused firms relative to diversified firms (See Panel E).
Lastly, we examine difference between high and low Q firms. As high Q firms have more growth options, risk taking incentives should be associated with a greater impact of MRI on customer R-S investments. As seen in panel F, though high Q firms have a more negative effect this is not significantly different from that for low Q firms.
In summary, the negative effect of managerial risk taking incentives on customer relationship specific investments varies across firms. The negative effects on customer R-S is higher when managerial risk taking incentives are more easily translated into riskier firm cash flows. This further supports our hypothesis that managerial risk taking incentives influence investments by customers.
Alternate Proxies for Relationship Specific Investment
In this section we explore proxies other than R&D intensity for customer relationship specific investments. Rauch (1999) shows that for differentiated goods, connections between buyers and sellers are made through a costly search process that gives rise to relationship specific investment. Though aggregate capital expenditures incurred by the firm cannot be regarded as relationship specific, for differentiated good industries, capital expenditures might better proxy for the extent of relationship specific investments. We therefore restrict our sample to firms that belong to industries that produce a differentiated product. We use Rauch (1999) list to select a subsample of industries that produce differentiated goods. 14 As seen in Model 1 of Table 5 , we find that in this subsample of firms, managerial risk taking is negatively associated with CAPEX.
This effect however is not robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects.
Thirdly, we use advertising intensity to proxy for relationship specific investment.
Advertising intensity tends to be higher in industries with differentiated good with non standardized output that require higher R-S investments (Levy 1985) ). Titman and Wessels (1988) also point out that advertising intensity proxies for product uniqueness and should be 14 Rauch (1999) list of industries producing differentiated goods is made available at the following website: http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/tradedata.html maintained by John Haveman and Raymond Robertson. We used Rauch (1999) conservative definition of what is a differentiated good. Finally, Rauch (1999) classification of SITC were converted to SIC codes using a mapping available form the US International Trade Commission.
highly associated with R-S investment. Advertising intensity is defined as the ratio of SG&A expenses to sales. As before, we construct customer SG&A intensity as the sales weighted value of advertising intensity. As seen in Model 3 we find that managerial risk taking is negatively associated with this new proxy of R-S investment. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects (Model 4).
Lastly, we use the NBER patent citation data to construct a proxy for the extent of relationship specific assets between firms and their customers. Citation of one another patents indicates the presence of communication between the scientists of both firms (See Jaffe,
Tratjtenberf and Fogarty (2000)). Citations of each other patents arise when technology from one patent was incorporated in the other product, or when the patent improved on the product concept, or when patents give feasibility to the product among others. Presence of cross citations between firms and their customers is therefore an indication of the degree of communication and integration between the two firms. The higher the cross citation of each others patents the greater is the likelihood of the presence of relationship specific assets.
The patent citation data is from NBER 2006 updated patent citation database available on Bronwyn Hall's website: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/patents.html. The data file of interest is the patent citation file, cite76_06, which includes patent numbers of the citing patent and the cited patent. We trace each patent number (for both the citing and cited patents) to NBER's unique patent assignee identifier, PDPASS using the patent assignee file, patassg. Next, we use the files dynass and pdpcohdr to map the patent identifier to Compustat. We then merge this citing/cited data to the firms and customers in our dataset built from the Compustat Segment Tapes.
We use the citation data to identify customers that cite the firm or customers that are cited by the firm in its patents over the past five years. These customers are more likely to have their R&D investments integrated with those of the firm, and therefore more likely to be relationship specific investments. We then construct a sales weighted average of R&D across these "cited/ citing" customers. As can be seen in Model 5 we continue to find significant evidence that higher MRI are associated with lower relationship specific investments by customers. This effect is robust to the inclusion of industry effects as seen in Model 6. Finally, as a robustness we also examine the relationship between R&D intensities of customers that have no citation relationship with the firm. As the R&D for these customers in not integrated with that of the firm, it is less likely to be relationship specific and more likely to be generalized investment. Consequently, it
should not be significantly effected by MRI incentives of the firms. Consistent with this we find that there is marginal evidence that higher managerial risk taking is associated with lower R&D investment for these customers (See model 7) and this conclusion is robust to the inclusion of industry effects (Model 8).
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Testing and Correcting for Endogeneity
The OLS results so far suggest that customer investment in relationship specific assets is negatively associated with managerial risk taking. One possible alternate explanation for these results could be the presence of unobservable firm characteristics that are both associated with high MRI and low customer R-S investments. This might account for the observed negative association between customer R-S investment and MRI. 15 We also tried use the presence of Joint Ventures between firms and customers to proxy for the existence of relationship specific assets. Joint ventures are very large commitments and are likely to be rare. Consistent with this we find that too few incidences of joint ventures between our sample firms over this time period to use this as a measure of relationship specific investment.
To test and control for this potential endogeneity we estimate a two stage least squares model by identifying instruments for MRI. We identify two instruments for MRI that are likely to be correlated with MRI but not with the error in the equation for customer R&D intensity.
The first instrument is the average industry MRI. This is the average MRI for all firms in the same two-digit SIC as the firm for that year. As compensation practices have a strong industry component we expect that industry year MRI to be positively correlated with the firm MRI. The industry year MRI should not be related to the research intensities of individual customer firms.
The second instrument is the average moneyness of the options. Moneyness, measured in dollars, is the average realizable value of options owned by the CEO. (The mean for our sample is 0.94, or a single average option for a CEO is about $1 in-the-money). As increase in moneyness increases delta and decreases vega, it is negatively associated with MRI. Moneyness of options should not be related to individual customer R&D intensity except through its relation with MRI.
As seen in Table 6 , both these instruments are highly significant in the first stage regression. The industry year MRI is positively correlated with MRI while average moneyness is negatively related to MRI. When we use the predicted MRI from the first stage, we find that it continues to be significantly negatively related to customer R-S investment. The Hausman test is not significant suggesting the lack of endogeneity given our instruments. The Hansen's J test of overidentifying restrictions is not significant pointing to the validity of the instruments used.
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These results suggest that endogeneity is not a significant concern for our analysis.
Are MRI and R-S investment jointly determined?
16 The Hausman test is based on the reasoning that if there is no endogeneity present then the 2SLS and OLS estimators should differ only by sampling error. The presence of significant differences implies endogeneity. See Wooldridge (2002) Our analysis so far has examined how customers respond to managerial risk taking incentives. However, it is quite likely that if R-S investment by customers is critical to the long term growth of the firm, then the firm will take into account the response of its customers to risk taking incentives when deciding on the compensation of its CEO. In other words, relationship specific investment by customers and the managerial risk taking incentives might be jointly determined.
To examine this we estimate a 2SLS simultaneous equation model (See also Kale and Shahrur (2007) ). In particular we estimate
where MRI is managerial risk taking and customer R-S is customer relationship specific investment as defined before. In equation (2), we instrument for MRI with average moneyness and industry level MRI as before and X represents all variables that influence customer R-S investment as in prior sections. In equation (1), we instrument for customer R-S investment using log of customer assets, customer leverage and percentage of customer's industry with non zero R&D expenses.
The results in Table 7 display second stage estimation of the two equations. As can be seen in Column 3, managerial risk taking is negatively related to customer R&D in line with prior results. However, we also find significant evidence that customer R&D negatively impacts managerial risk taking (see column 2). These results suggest, not surprisingly, that managerial risk taking incentives and customer relationship specific investment are jointly determined and are negatively related to each other. In other words, customers respond to managerial risk taking incentives by reducing relationship specific investment and firms take this response into account, i.e., reduce managerial risk taking incentives when customer relationship specific investment is important.
Industry Level Identification of Customers and Suppliers
In this section, we identify customers and supplier industries instead of identifying specific customers. We take all firms in the customers industry to create customer level variables and similarly use all firms in the supplier industry to create supplier level variables.
Since our customer and supplier R&D intensity is at the industry level rather than firm level, use of this dataset mitigates some of the endogeneity concerns that arise from identifying individual customer firms. 17 Due to a change made by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the newer IO tables are organized by NAICS code. As a result, all of our industry-level analysis is performed by 4-digit historical NAICS code, which is available in Compustat. After merging our 21,935
Execucomp firm-years with the IO tables by NAICS, our sample drops to 10,008 firm-years.
Excluding financial and utility firms shrinks the final sample to 8,733 firm-years.
Customer and supplier industry R&D is the sum of R&D expense for all firms in that industry that are covered in Compustat divided by the total industry book assets as given in
Compustat. Industry sales growth is the sales growth of the median firm in the industry and industry leverage is the sum of book value of debt divided by the total assets of the industry. Finally, as seen in Table 9 we continue to find a strong negative relationship between MRI and customer R&D intensity. The coefficient of MRI is -0.0075 (see model 1 in Table 9) and is very similar to the coefficient of -0.0065 estimated in the firm level dataset. More importantly, we find that MRI is negatively related to supplier R&D intensity as well. Suppliers significantly reduce their R-S investments when the CEO has large risk taking incentives.
Conclusions
In this paper, we find a significant negative impact of managerial risk taking incentives or MRI on relationship-specific investments of both customer and supplier firms. Further, this negative impact of managerial risk taking on R-S investments of customers is significantly higher for high R&D firms, for firms with high capital expenditures, for firms in manufacturing industries and for firms in competitive industries. As these are precisely firms where managerial risk taking incentives can have a large impact on the volatility of cash flow, a significant larger reduction in customer R-S investments in this case is supportive of our hypothesis. The analysis at the industry level not only corroborates the results of a reduction in customer R-S investments in a much larger dataset but also shows that they are equally applicable to R-S investments by suppliers. As relationship specific investments by customers and suppliers is crucial for the long term growth of the firm, the results in this paper suggest that though managerial risk taking incentives may have the desired short term effect of increased risk taking they could have long term detrimental effects by undermining the implicit contracts with customers and suppliers and reducing their investment in the vertical channel. The results in the paper underscore how compensation structures designed to impact managerial behavior within a firm can have strong externalities and effect the decision of other entities the firm interacts with in the economy. Customer Leverage: Weighted average of customer market leverage. Market leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to market value of the firm and weights are the share of sales to the customer.
Customer R&D: Weighted average R&D intensity of customers. R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. The weights are the share of sales to the customers.
Customer Sales Growth:
The weighted average sales growth of all customers. Sales growth is the annual increase in sales and the weights are the share of sales to customers.
Customer Vega: The weighted average vega of all the customers of the firms. Each customer vega is the per option vega multiplied by the number of options held by the CEO. The weights used are the sales to customer divided by total firm sales and need not sum to one as all customers of the firm are not identified.
Delta:
The product of per option delta and the number of options held by the CEO.
Herfindahl Index: is the sum of squared market shares (in sales) of the firm's two digit NAICS industry.
MRI:
Managerial risk taking, i.e., the ratio of delta to vega.
Market Leverage: is the ratio of book value of debt to market value of the firm. Market value of the firm is the sum of book value of debt and the market value of equity.
R&D Intensity:
The ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. This has been assigned a value of zero when the firm does not report any R&D expenses.
ROA:
The ratio of net income to Total Assets. We use the lagged value of ROA.
Sales Volatility: The standard deviation of prior three years of sales.
Tobin's Q:
The ratio of the market value of the firm to book value of the firm.
Vega:
The product of per option vega and the number of options held by the CEO.
Table 1 Summary Statistics
The dataset is constructed from Execucomp over the period 1994 -2007 is the product of per option delta (vega) with the number of options owned by the CEO. MRI is the ratio of option vega to option delta. Number of options is the total number of options held by the CEO. Log[Total Assets] is the Log of Book Assets. Tobin's Q is market value of the firm divided by the book value of the firm. Market Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the market value of the firm. R&D Intensity is firm R&D expense divided by total assets. Firm ROA is prior year net income divided by total assets. Sales volatility is the standard deviation of prior three years' sales intensity. CEO Ownership is percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO. CEO Tenure is the number of years the CEO has held the position. CEO Turnover year is a dummy = 1 if it is the year of CEO turnover. CEO Cash Comp is the Log of CEO Salary + Bonus. Herf Index is the firm's industry concentration. Customer R&D is the weighted average of all identifiable customers' R&D Intensity (weighted by % of total sales). Customer Vega is the weighted average of all identifiable customers' Vega (weighted by % of sales). Customer Leverage and Customer Sales growth are similarly defined. Customer weights are not required to sum to one. Vega is the product of per option vega with the number of options owned by the CEO and represents the dollar increase in CEO wealth (in thousands) for a 1% increase in stock volatility. MRI is Vega/Delta. R&D Intensity is firm R&D expense divided by total assets. CEO Ownership is percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO. CEO Cash Comp is equal to the Log of CEO Salary + Bonus. Customer R&D is the weighted average of all identifiable customers' R&D Intensity (weighted by % of total sales). Customer weights are not required to sum to one. All compensation variables are lagged. All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile. Table 3 Continued….
The constant term was included but not reported for brevity. Model 6, 7 and 10 include both year and industry fixed effects. Number of Gvkeys for Model 8 and 9 are 708. This table reports selected coefficients from the OLS regression where the dependent variable is the sales weighted customer R&D intensity. R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Other variables included but not reported are log of number of options, log of total assets, Tobin's Q, market leverage, return on assets, R&D intensity, sales volatility, Herf Index, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, a dummy for CEO turnover year, CEO log of CEO cash compensation. Also included are Customer Vega, customer leverage and customer R&D intensity. All compensation variables are lagged. In panel A, firm with a positive R&D (zero) expense are in the positive (no) R&D group. For Panel B, a firm is defined as high Capex if the firm's Capital expenditure to total assets ratio is in the top tercile of all firms. All other firms are in the low capex group. For panel C, manufacturing firms are defined as having a 2-digit SIC code between 20 and 39 with all other in the non-manufacturing group. For panel D, high HI firms are those with main industry Herfindahl index in the top tercile with all other in the other group. For Panel G firms in the High Q are those with Q in the top tercile and all others are in the low Q group. (Models 1 and 2 ) and customer sales weighted SGA (Models 3 and 4). CAPEX is defined as capital expenditures to total assets and SGA is the selling, general and administrative expenses to sales. Model 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the customer sales weighted R&D intensities but only customers that have patents that cite the firm or are cited by the firm are included. For Model 7 and 8, the dependent variable is the sales weighted customer R&D intensities but only for customers that have no patent cross citations with the firm. MRI is Vega/Delta. Other control variables included in the estimation but not displayed in the table due to brevity are Total Assets, Tobin's Q (market value over book value of the firm), Market Leverage ( book value of debt by the market value of the firm), RD Intensity ( firm R&D expense by total assets), Firm ROA (prior year net income by total assets), Sales volatility (the standard deviation of prior three years' sales intensity), CEO Ownership (percentage of shares held by the CEO), CEO Tenure (number of years the CEO has held the position), CEO Turnover year (a dummy = 1 if a turnover occurred in the year), CEO Cash Comp (Log of CEO Salary + Bonus), Herf Index (firm's industry concentration), and Customer Vega (weighted average of all identifiable customers' Vega (weighted by % of sales)). Customer weights are not required to sum to one. All compensation variables are lagged. All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. 
CAPEX for
Table 6 Controlling for Potential Endogeneity
Dependent variable in the first stage is MRI, which is the ratio of the vega to delta of CEO options. The dependent variable in the second stage is Customer R&D intensity which is the sales weighted R&D intensity of all customers. R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value to book value of the firm. Market Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the market value of the firm. Firm ROA is lagged and is the ratio of net income to total assets. Sales volatility is the standard deviation of prior three years' sales intensity. CEO Ownership is percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO. CEO Tenure is the number of years the CEO has held the position. CEO Turnover year is a dummy = 1 in the year of turnover. CEO Cash Comp is the Log of CEO Salary + Bonus. Herf Index is reference firm's industry concentration. Customer R&D, Vega, Leverage, and Sales growth are the sales weighted average of all identifiable customers' R&D Intensities, Vega, leverage, and sales growth respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. 
Standard IV estimation Iterated GMM IV estimation
Table 7 Simultaneous Equations Model
The table displays results of a simultaneous equation model estimated using 2SLS. The dependent variable in equation (1) is MRI while that in equation (2) is customer R&D. MRI is instrumented by average moneyness of CEO options and industry-year MRI. Customer R&D is instrumented by log of customer assets, customer leverage, and percentage of customer's industry with R&D activity (Customer Ind % RD). R&D Intensity is R&D/Total Assets (zero if missing). MRI is Vega/Delta and is lagged in the first specification and contemporaneous in the second specification. Log Options is the Log of stock options held by the CEO. Log[Total Assets] is the Log of Book Assets. Tobin's Q is market value of the firm divided by the book value of the firm. Market Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the market value of the firm. RD Intensity is firm R&D expense divided by total assets. Firm ROA is prior year net income divided by total assets. Sales volatility is the standard deviation of prior three years' sales intensity. CEO Ownership is percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO. CEO Tenure is the number of years the CEO has held the position. CEO Turnover year is a dummy = 1 if a turnover occurred in the observation year. CEO Cash Comp is equal to the Log of CEO Salary + Bonus. Herf Index is reference firm's industry concentration. Customer R&D is the weighted average of all identifiable customers' R&D Intensity (weighted by % of total sales). Customer Q is the weighted average of all identifiable customers' Tobin's Q. Customer Vega is the weighted average of all identifiable customers' Vega (weighted by % of sales). Customer weights are not required to sum to one. All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. Delta (vega) is the product of per option delta (vega) with the number of options held. MRI is the ratio of vega to delta. R&D intensity is R&D/Total Assets (zero if missing). Log[Total Assets] is the Log of Book Assets. Tobin's Q is market value of the firm divided by the book value of the firm. Market Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the market value of the firm. Firm ROA is prior year net income divided by total assets. Sales volatility is the standard deviation of prior three years' sales intensity. CEO Ownership is percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO. CEO Tenure is the number of years the CEO has held the position. CEO Turnover year is a dummy = 1 if a turnover occured in the observation year. CEO Cash Comp is equal to the Log of CEO Salary + Bonus. Herf Index is reference firm's industry concentration. Supplier and Customer R&D is the weighted average of all Supplier and Customer industries' R&D Intensity (weighted by % of total sales). Supplier and Customer Q (HI)is the weighted average of all Supplier and Customer industries' Tobin's Q (HI or Herfindahl index 
